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Montag, 29. Februar 2016

DEIKON GMBH I.I. DGAP-Adhoc: DEIKON GmbH i.I.: Geltendmachung von Schadensersatzansprühen: Rechtskräftige Entscheidung des Bundesgerichtshofsc

DGAP-Adhoc: DEIKON GmbH i.I.: Geltendmachung von Schadensersatzansprühen: Rechtskräftige Entscheidung des Bundesgerichtshofsc

DGAP-Ad-hoc: DEIKON GmbH i.I. / Schlagwort(e): Rechtssache
DEIKON GmbH i.I.: Geltendmachung von Schadensersatzansprüchen: Rechtskräftige
Entscheidung des Bundesgerichtshofs

29.02.2016 / 16:55
Veröffentlichung einer Ad-hoc-Mitteilung nach § 15 WpHG.
Für den Inhalt der Mitteilung ist der Emittent verantwortlich.

Geltendmachung von Schadensersatzansprüchen: Rechtskräftige Entscheidung des

Köln/Düsseldorf, 29.02.2016

Im Rahmen der Geltendmachung von Schadensersatzansprüchen gegen frühere
Vorstandsmitglieder der Boetzelen Real Estate AG (jetzt: DEIKON GmbH) wegen des
Abschlusses eines Zinsswapvertrags am 14.08.2008, wie in der Ad hoc-Mitteilung
vom 16.12.2010 und der Ad hoc-Mitteilung vom 04.12.2012 erwähnt, ist heute eine
rechtskräftige Entscheidung des Bundesgerichtshofs zugestellt worden. Die
beklagten früheren Vorstandsmitglieder wurden rechtskräftig verurteilt, an den
Insolvenzverwalter EUR 6.547.785,75 zzgl. Rechtshängigkeitszinsen zu zahlen.

Der Insolvenzverwalter wird nunmehr den Anspruch durchsetzen und insbesondere
gegenüber der seinerzeit bestehenden D&O-Versicherung geltend machen. Der genaue
Zeitpunkt und die genaue Höhe eines Erlöses aus der Geltendmachung kann derzeit
nicht prognostiziert werden.


Der Geschäftsführer


Sprache:     Deutsch

Unternehmen: DEIKON GmbH i.I.

             Brückenstraße 21

             50667  Köln


Telefon:     +49 (0) 221 650 660



ISIN:        DE000A0EPM07, DE000A0JQAG2, DE000A0KAHL9

WKN:         A0EPM0, A0JQAG, A0KAHL

Börsen:      Regulierter Markt in Düsseldorf, Frankfurt (General Standard)

Ende der Mitteilung DGAP News-Service
441255  29.02.2016 

die 3 Titanen.....


Daniel A. Pollack, Special Master appointed to preside over settlement negotiations between the Republic of Argentina and its “Holdout” Bondholders, this morning issued the following statement:
“It gives me greatest pleasure to announce that the 15-year pitched battle between the Republic of Argentina and Elliott Management, led by Paul E. Singer, is now well on its way to being resolved.  The parties last night signed an Agreement in Principle after three months of intense, around-the-clock negotiations under my supervision.  The Agreement in Principle, if consummated, will pay NML Capital Ltd, the fund managed by Elliott, and several other funds of other managers who had sued alongside NML, the aggregate sum of approximately $4.653 billion dollars to settle all claims, both in the Southern District of New York and world-wide. This is a giant step forward in this long-running litigation, but not the final step.  The Agreement in Principle is subject to approval by the Congress of Argentina and, specifically, the lifting of the Lock Law and the Sovereign Payment Law, enacted under an earlier Administration and which would bar such settlements.  Thereafter, Argentina contemplates a capital-raise in the global financial markets, which would be used to fund the payments.  The four “holdout” Bondholders who are signatories to this Agreement in Principle,have agreed not to attempt to attach or otherwise interfere with that capital-raise. Upon payment, the Injunctions entered several years ago against Argentina by Judge Thomas P. Griesa would automatically dissolve if Judge Griesa’s Indicative Ruling of February 19 is converted into a final Order vacating the Injunctions. The parties have agreed to take all steps necessary to cooperate with me in my capacity as Special Master and with each other to effect a consummation of the Agreement in Principle and a termination of the litigation.  It is hoped by the parties that all necessary steps can be taken in a period of six weeks.  The Agreement in Principle, if consummated, will pay the Funds managed by Elliott Management, Aurelius Capital, Davidson Kempner and Bracebridge Capital, 75% of their full judgments including principal and interest, plus a payment to settle claims outside the Southern District of New York and certain legal fees and expenses incurred by them over a 15-year period.
There are many people who have devoted untold hours or special talents, or both, to making this settlement possible.  Foremost among them is Hon. Thomas P. Griesa, the Federal Judge who presided over all cases in re Argentina Debt Litigation for 15 years.  Others entitled to greatest credit are President Mauricio Macri of Argentina, who immediately upon his election in November, set about to change the negative course that the Republic had steered in this litigation, and his Secretary of Finance Luis Caputo, who led the delegation that met with me in my capacity as Special Master and  with the “holdout” Bondholders for countless hours, with patience, good will and intelligence.  He was ably assisted by Santiago Bausili, Under Secretary of Finance. Also involved as important decision-makers for Argentina were: Alfonso Prat-Gay, Minister of the Economy, and Marcos Pena and Mario Quintana, the Chief and Vice Chief of the Cabinet.  Their course-correction for Argentina was nothing short of heroic. On the “holdout” hedge fund side, Paul E. Singer was the central figure who involved himself intensely with me over the past several weeks on behalf of the “holdout” Bondholders.  He was a tough but fair negotiator.  His second-in-command, Jon Pollock, also made a key contribution to the success of the negotiations.  All of the senior principals of the “holdout” hedge funds demonstrated vast talent.  No party to a settlement gets everything it seeks.  A settlement is, by definition, a compromise and, fortunately, both sides to this epic dispute finally saw the need to compromise, and have done so.
This settlement, if consummated, together with prior Agreements in Principle with other “holdout” Bondholders, resolves over 85% of the claims of those with “pari passu” and “me-too” Injunctions.  I will continue to serve, at the pleasure of Judge Griesa, until all claims are resolved, both with respect to the consummation of this central Agreement in Principle and to facilitate settlement with all other “holdout” Bondholders who wish to resolve their claims with Argentina.  In short, I will continue to help the willing find solutions. 

Argentina, holdout creditors reach $4.6 bln agreement

Monday, February 29, 2016

Argentina, holdout creditors reach $4.6 bln agreement

Argentina and its main holdout creditors have reached a $4.653 billion agreement in principle to settle a 15-year-old sovereign debt default dispute, a deal that could help the country to return to international capital markets and revive its economy.
The deal, agreed to late on Sunday and announced by the New York court-appointed mediator Daniel Pollack on Monday, will see the four largest remaining holdout creditors get paid 75 percent of the amount outstanding on their full judgments, including principal and interest.
"This is a giant step forward in this long-running litigation, but not the final step," Pollack said in his statement.
"The agreement in principle is subject to approval by the Congress of Argentina and, specifically, the lifting of the Lock Law and the Sovereign Payment Law, enacted under an earlier administration and which would bar such settlements," he said.
Hedge fund Elliott Management, run by Paul Singer, brought numerous lawsuits against Argentina over the course of the dispute, with hearings before US District Judge Thomas Griesa, that were appealed but failed to gain a hearing before the US Supreme Court.
He was a tough but fair negotiator," Pollack said, adding: "A settlement is, by definition, a compromise and, fortunately, both sides to this epic dispute finally saw the need to compromise, and have done so."
The remaining largest holdout investors include Aurelius Capital Management, run by former Elliott alumni Mark Brodsky, as well as Davidson Kempner and Bracebridge Capital.
A spokesperson from Elliot said: “We are pleased to have reached an agreement with Argentina. We are hopeful that the completed negotiations, held under the aegis of Special Master Daniel Pollack, have cleared the way for other plaintiffs to reach satisfactory resolutions as well.”
The holdouts rejected two prior debt restructurings in 2005 and 2010 that paid out roughly 30 cents on the dollar. The investors who accepted those deals, referred to as exchange bondholders, have not been paid principal and interest on their bonds since a second default in the summer of 2014 resulting in part from New York court decisions.
Intense talks in 2014 with the Fernandez administration ended without a deal and leaving in place an injunction by Griesa that no one would get their principal and interest unless all creditors were paid at the same time.
A previously scheduled hearing before Griesa is still expected to take place on Tuesday.
Finance Minister Alfonso Prat Gay and Secretary Luis Caputo are scheduled to hold a press conference today at 6 pm.

das hört sich doch alles recht gut an.....

Argentina Reaches $4.65 Billion Debt Deal With Main Holdouts

Argentina Reaches $4.65 Billion Debt Deal With Main Holdouts

Argentina and a group of holdout creditors have agreed in principal to bring an end to a 15-year legal dispute over defaulted debt.
Argentina will pay a group of litigants led by Paul Singer’s Elliott Management $4.65 billion, or about 75 percent of their full judgments including principal and interest, according to a statement by Daniel Pollack, the court-appointed mediator. The funds, which also include Aurelius Capital Management, Davidson Kempner and Bracebridge Capital, will also receive a payment to settle claims outside New York District court and for certain legal fees and expenses incurred during the dispute.
The deal is subject to Argentine Congressional approval and the repealing of several debt laws. It may take about six weeks to close a deal and holdout funds have agreed not to interfere in Argentina’s expected raising of capital to pay for the settlements. Argentina has now resolved about 85 percent of claims.
“This is a giant step forward in this long-running litigation, but not the final step,” Pollack said.
To contact the reporter on this story:
Charlie Devereux in Buenos Aires at

Holdouts face deadline today on settlement

Monday, February 29, 2016

Holdouts face deadline today on settlement

Judge Griesa has called a hearing for tomorrow with Argentina and ‘vulture’ funds
A key week begins today in Argentina’s long-running legal battle against holdout funds that could mark the beginning of the end of a decade-long legal battle that has kept the country out of international capital markets for more than a decade.
Today is the deadline for the holdout funds to give an answer regarding Argentina’s initial offer and tomorrow there will be a hearing for the holdouts to set out their positions in regards to the conditions imposed by New York Judge Thomas Griesa to lift the current injunction that forbids the country from servicing much of its foreign-law debt.
President Mauricio Macri is expressing confidence that a deal will be reached soon.
“I am confident the court proceedings with the creditors can be closed within a couple of weeks — confident and optimistic,” Macri said in an interview with Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera during a visit to Rome.
Settlement talks have been making progress, court-apointed mediator Daniel Pollack said last week, after creditors who have been suing Argentina in US courts said that broad terms of an agreement were in place.
Last week, a lawyer representing NML Capital, an affiliate of hedge fund Elliott Management, as well as other leading holdouts such as Aurelius Capital Management, said an agreement in principle on economic terms of roughly US$5 billion had been reached.
The statement by the lawyer, Matthew McGill, was made during a related hearing before a federal appeals court. Pollack later criticized the statement as a violation of an understanding of confidentiality between the parties.
Griesa has called a hearing for tomorrow to hear arguments from Argentina’s creditors regarding the embargoes that are currently in place against the country.
Argentina’s lawyers had called on Griesa to call a hearing of all creditors as soon as possible and after that request was granted, NML requested that it be postponed, which was rejected by the US court.
The holdouts urged the Second US Circuit Court of Appeals last week to not dismiss various appeals by Argentina that, while pending, prevented Griesa from lifting the injunctions. Griesa had said he would lift the injunctions but said he lacked jurisdiction to do so while the appeals were pending.
While the appeals court said it would dismiss the appeals as Argentina requested, the judges said they would direct that any order by Griesa be put on hold for two weeks to allow bondholders to appeal.
Analysts have long said that the holdout funds are interested in dragging on the process as long as possible in order to twist Argentina’s arm in negotiations. While the biggest holdouts have battled Argentina in court for years, Macri’s administration has made no secret of its desire to close the legal battle in order to issue debt.
The proposed total US$6.5 billion settlement offer announced by Argentina on February 5 represents a 27.5 percent to 30 percent discount for creditors who filed claims of about US$9 billion.
The settlements are conditioned on the approval of the Argentine Congress and the lifting of injunctions in the litigation. Earlier this week, Finance Minister Alfonso Prat-Gay said Argentina is planning to issue bonds worth US$15 billion to pay the holdout funds.
“One-third of the funds have already accepted our offer,” Prat-Gay said.
The speaker of the Lower House of Congress, Emilio Monzó, said in an interview published yesterday that he expects negotiations with holdouts “to close this week.”
Monzó also expressed confidence that the government will be able to obtain enough votes to abolish the Padlock Law (Ley Cerrojo) and the Sovereign Payment Law as demanded by Griesa.
“We trust in the agreements with other caucuses, including the Renewal Front and the Justicialist bloc,” Monzó said.

Argentina, Main Holdouts Agree in Principle on $4.65 Billion Deal

Argentina, Main Holdouts Agree in Principle on $4.65 Billion Deal

Argentina and holdouts including Paul Singer’s NML Capital reached an agreement last night, special mediator Daniel Pollack says in e-mailed statement. The agreement is subject to congressional repeal of debt laws that block the reopening of 2005 and 2010 restructurings.

Gewinn PDVSA-Sinker-17 28.100 EUR das sind 39,67 % .....not so bad.....

Steuern Fiskus erkennt Negativzins nicht an Der Bank Negativzinsen zu zahlen ist ärgerlich für den Sparer. Kann er den Verlust wenigstens beim Finanzamt geltend machen?

SteuernFiskus erkennt Negativzins nicht an

Der Bank Negativzinsen zu zahlen ist ärgerlich für den Sparer. Kann er den Verlust wenigstens beim Finanzamt geltend machen?
© DPANegativzinsen kann man nicht absetzen.
Wenn Sparer bei ihrer Bank Negativzinsen zahlen müssen, können sie diese beim Finanzamt nicht als Verlust geltend machen, um sie mit Gewinnen aus anderen Sparanlagen zu verrechnen. Das hat dasBundesfinanzministerium nach Absprache mit den Bundesländern verfügt. Nach Ansicht der Ministerialbeamten handelt es sich bei „negativen Einlagezinsen“ um eine „Art Verwahr- und Einlagegebühr“. Diese sei bei Kapitaleinkünften bereits vom Sparerpauschbetrag in Höhe von 801 Euro jährlich erfasst.
Darüber hinausgehende Werbungskosten können nach dem Einkommensteuergesetz nicht von den Zinserträgen abgezogen werden, auf die eine Kapitalertragsteuer von 25 Prozent plus Solidaritätszuschlag zur pauschalen Abgeltung anfällt (Paragraph 20 Absatz 9).
Kann der Sparer Negativzinsen beim Finanzamt geltend machen?
Nach Einschätzung des Ministeriums handelt es sich bei Negativzinsen dagegen nicht um Zinsen im Sinne des Gesetzes. Diese werden dort definiert als „Entgelt für die Überlassung des Kapitalvermögens“ – „unabhängig von der Bezeichnung und der zivilrechtlichen Ausgestaltung der Kapitalanlage“ (Paragraph 20 Absatz 1). Hier zahle die Zinsen aber gerade nicht der Kapitalnehmer, sondern der Sparer, also der Kapitalgeber (Az.: IV C 1 – S 2252/08/10004:017). Anders ist dies bei Aktien: Dort können Verluste beim Verkauf mit Gewinnen verrechnet werden, und zwar im selben Jahr oder auch später.

Steuerberater mit Kritik

Der Deutsche Steuerberaterverband kritisiert die Regelung scharf. „Die wirtschaftliche Wertung des Bundesfinanzministeriums ist in Zeiten des ausschließlich politisch motivierten Niedrigzinsniveaus das völlig falsche Signal“, sagte dessen Präsident Harald Elster der F.A.Z.. Sparer seien ohnehin schon die Leidtragenden. „Damit wird der Anlagemotivation nun gänzlich der Garaus gemacht.“ Mit der Entscheidung verschließe die Politik – wie schon bei den Pensionsrückstellungen oder aber dem allgemeinen Zinssatz auf Steuernachzahlungen – die Augen vor den wirtschaftlichen Realitäten.
Mehr zum Thema
Die Europäische Zentralbank verlangt mittlerweile Strafzinsen von Banken, die Geld bei ihr parken. Erste Finanzinstitute in Deutschland geben diese Last mittlerweile an ihre Kunden weiter, bisher aber nur an Geschäftskunden, nicht an Kleinsparer. Auch der Gesundheitsfonds der Krankenkassen musste erstmals Strafzinsen an Banken zahlen, wie die F.A.Z. vergangene Woche schon berichtete.

Sonntag, 28. Februar 2016

About That $1 Trillion In Distressed Credit: UBS Responds To Wall Street's Shock

About That $1 Trillion In Distressed Credit: UBS Responds To Wall Street's Shock

Tyler Durden's picture

Two weeks ago, during the peak of the February market rout, UBS' credit strategist Matthew Mish looked at the latest round in the junk bond selloff and answered a rhetorical question: "Is it time to buy" the bonds that comprise some/any/all of the bonds that make up the USD-denominated $3 trillion speculative grade universe. His answer was hardly pleasant for those who have kept peddling junk credit (including bonds, loans and revolvers) for the past several months:
  • First, investors will require compensation for loss risks; cohorts of triple Cs typically experience 5yr cumulative default rates of 55 - 65% near the end of the cycle, implying half of the universe defaults before the end of year 5 and no longer pay coupons. Assuming recovery rates of 35% an investor should require roughly 12% yield to compensate for loss risks alone.
  • What about mark-to-market and liquidity risks? While triple C bonds are trading on average in the low $60s, investors will likely need to stomach a further decline later in the cycle. Historically, triple C prices bottomed in the $40 – 50 range, so potential MTM declines could be significant.
And while the fundamentals' clear answer is "not yet", the one thing that concerned Mish the most is the ever rising illiquidity in the bond space, which is what prompted him to conclude that for junk yields have to hit as high as 25% before they become "attractive":
... investors will need to be compensated for the fact that illiquidity may prevent them from selling when needed. Bottom line, our conversations with investors suggest yields in the 20 – 25% context could be attractive enough to draw in marginal capital – although several investors noted that is reasonable for triple C risk excluding commodities. In short, we're not there yet.
In other words, "junk bonds" are actually... junk.
His bearish assessment led to a firestorm of protests from Wall Street asset managers for whom a selloff in itself had become a catalyst to buy: alas, the BTFD mentality so prevalent in equity markets over the past 7 years has spread to even the market's more rational corners. As such, someone telling them it's not a time to buy yet has led to a dramatic cognitive dissonance which demands an immediate explanation.

So, to clear up any confusion, here is Matthew Mish responding to the barrage of angry bulls why the $1 trillion in distressed credit - a third of the entire universe - is not just an energy story, and responding to the five most important and recurring questions:
  • First, how do we get to $1tn in distressed credit?
  • Second, what proportion is energy and metals/mining related?
  • Third, where are we in the commodity default cycle?
  • Fourth, when are the triggers for a refinancing crunch?
  • Fifth, what is the scope of the problem outside USD denominated speculative grade markets?
Here is his full report:
$1tn in distressed credit: Not just an energy story
Our prior research on the fate of roughly one trillion in distressed credit has elicited a maelstrom of follow-up questions. Below we outline some of the most commonly asked questions to help frame out the size, scope and potential systemic risks posed by distressed corporate debt.
First, how do we get to $1tn in distressed credit? The traditional definition of distressed credit is the lowest-rated debt in the speculative grade bond and loan markets. In this context, we have previously shown that triple C rated debt currently comprises over 20% of US high yield bond market indices and 26% of all speculative grade rated issuers (bonds and loans, based on Moody's ratings and universe). Alternatively, the traditional market implied definition of distressed debt is debt trading at a spread greater than 1,000bp. Under this interpretation in the US HY bond market currently approximately 31% of debt outstanding is trading distressed. The comparable figures for US leveraged loans are smaller; however, they will climb through the credit cycle as rating downgrades and defaults rise. Our initial analysis focused solely on USD denominated speculative grade debt: roughly $1.5tn of US high yield bonds, $900bn of US leveraged loans, and $400-500bn of US leveraged revolving credit facilities and private debt securities. Simply put, 25 – 30% distressed within a broader USD denominated, speculative grade universe of nearly $3tn.
Second, what proportion is energy and metals/mining related? The bulk of commodity related debt was issued in the US HY bond, not loan market. As per above, the proportion of triple C rated HY bonds from commodity-related industries is 33%. Alternatively, the percent of commodity related distressed debt implied from market pricing (i.e., trading above 1,000bp in spread) is approximately 45% of the total. However, the proportion related to commodity exposure in the US leveraged loan market is lower. Based on our ratings-based and market implied approaches the proportion of commodity related distressed debt is 10-15% of the distressed loan universe. In sum, commodity related exposure is the largest single factor driving distress – but it is a minority share that, in aggregate, represents about 25% of all distressed exposure. Where are the other pressure points? The next largest sectors with distressed  debt include: telecommunications, retail, healthcare, technology, media/entertainment and services.
Third, where are we in the commodity default cycle? The trailing 12-month default rate for the US speculative grade natural resource sector is 12.2%, up from 6.8% and 3%, 6 and 12-months prior; for context, 30 energy and 15 metals/mining firms defaulted in 2015 as per S&P. The forward outlook will depend heavily on commodity prices; however, even if prices stabilize and incrementally move higher (inline with the strip) we expect significant default realizations ahead. For HY energy issuers (excluding IG, crossover) liquidity options are running thin: debt capital markets are shut, banks are (attempting to) cut exposures ahead of the April redetermination and bondholders are tired of losing in distressed exchanges.
As per S&P there are approximately 100 and 50 energy and metals/mining issuers, respectively, in their speculative grade universe; based on market prices 85-90% of commodity related HY debt is trading at distressed levels (spreads north of 1,000bp), and 40-65% is trading in excess of 2,000bp. Bottom line, it is not unreasonable to assume another 50 – 75 defaults in the commodity universe over the next 12 months.Admittedly, credit spreads are leading commodity defaults; energy and metals/mining spreads are trading at 1,800bp – reflecting a high teens default environment. However, in a lower for longer world commodity spreads are unlikely to rally – spreads may tighten mechanically as a technical result of issuers defaulting and falling out of the indices. But we worry about the contagion effects to risk appetite and broader capital market access as investors roll through this default wave.
Fourth, when are the triggers for a refinancing crunch? In the commodity space, to be clear, bond maturities are not the trigger. Negative cash flow due to depressed profits is triggering bankruptcies (prepacks) as firms run out of liquidity; i.e., they cannot afford to pay interest – even as many do not face imminent maturities. The onus then is on the profit outlook for the broader speculative grade universe. We see profit declines persisting, partly as rising funding costs pressure fundamentals, but are not calling for a profit recession for the sector at this point. However, weak profits will coincide with rising refinancing needs in the next year to 18 months. In terms of maturities, the bulk of the nearer term wall is in loans, not bonds. According to S&P rated speculative grade bonds maturing 2016 – 2018 total $122bn, but loans (including pull-forward effects) maturing over the same period total $298bn (amid a backdrop of tighter regulation on bank lending and a plunge in CLO issuance3). The bulk of the maturing debt lies, first, in the telecom/ media/technology and, second, the energy/metals mining sectors.
Fifth, what is the scope of the problem outside USD denominated speculative grade markets? Our prior analysis does not incorporate two key segments of the global corporate debt universe: European and emerging market debt. On the former, the European high yield bond market is €325bn as per iBoxx, small in comparison to its US peer. And it is true that over two-thirds of the composition is higher-quality (double B). However, the lending model in Europe is bank loans, not bonds. According to the ECB Eurozone bank lending to Eurozone corporates is about €4.3tn, which includes high grade and leveraged loans (i.e., the comparable figure for European IG and HY bonds outstanding is €1.7tn). Disclosure on credit quality is lacking; however, based on syndicated loan issuance tracked by Dealogic we estimate roughly 20 – 25% of these loans are to leveraged corporates or nearly $1tn. Based on the sample of rated issuers roughly 25-30% (or €250 – 300bn) is lower rated and likely to be distressed credit through the cycle. Conversely, for the latter, the issue is further complicated by not only poor disclosure but also the interaction of corporate and sovereign credit worthiness.

Argentina inches closer to bond return with holdouts deal

t would be the country’s first international debt issuance in more than a decade

Saturday, February 27, 2016

Argentina inches closer to bond return with holdouts deal

By Paul Kilby
Reuters (*)
NEW YORK — The prospect of a bond sale of up to US$15 billion from Argentina — its first international debt issue in more than a decade — is growing nearer as negotiations with the country’s holdout creditors approach the finish line.
Argentina could come to market as soon as next month with the lifting of a pari passu injunction preventing debt payments and the nearing of a long-sought deal with heavyweight hedge funds Elliott and Aurelius, which have been battling the sovereign in the courts.
Finance Minister Alfonso Prat Gay said this week that Argentina would issue a US$15 billion bond to pay the holdout creditors once the country’s Congress had repealed certain debt laws preventing it from offering them better payment terms.
Nullifying those laws — and the payment of all holdout creditors who agree to Argentina's proposal by February 29 — are conditions for lifting the injunction that effectively forced the sovereign to default on its restructured bonds in 2014. That will pave the way for the sovereign’s return to the markets.
“We expect the (repeal of those laws) to happen in the first half of March, and then issuance could happen after that,” said John Baur, a portfolio manager at Boston-based investment management firm Eaton Vance.
Latin America has seen just US$14.8 billion in new supply from five issuers this year, so Argentina’s return to the international bond market after 15 years will be a major event.
A deal of the expected size of Argentina’s return is rare for the region, even in the most bullish of times, and getting a slice of the action will be vital for DCM bankers who have had to content themselves with slim pickings and falling primary volumes.
But can the markets absorb a US$15 billion offering in one fell swoop?
While some have their doubts, many think Argentina’s exceptional circumstances make such a foray possible — even though the buyside has lost its enthusiasm for emerging market credits.
“We have a high degree of confidence that it is doable, assuming you have a stable market,” one debt syndicate banker said. “This is one of the few positive stories in EM.”
Still, the deal would almost certainly have to come in both US dollars and euros with a variety of tenors, and would require a broad sweep of the global investor base as well.
“If they need all the US$15 billion at once, they could do US$10 billion in dollars and US$5 billion in euros,” said Sean Newman, a senior portfolio manager at Invesco. “The market is there, but it would lead to some indigestion.”
In addition, once the sovereign has market access, it is expected to go back for more as it seeks to plug the country's large fiscal gap. Other Argentine borrowers are also likely to follow in its footsteps.
“There will be a lot of supply coming out of Argentina, and that is where it gets challenging for investors to digest the supply,” said Baur at Eaton Vance.
“The flip side is that they are starting from very low levels of debt and there is a lot of room for the government to expand the amount of debt. That is one of the reasons I would look at (the bond issue).”
In fact, the size of the deal may help, as it will give the country significant weighting in debt indices and will force accounts to sit up and listen.
“If the larger asset managers are underweight Argentina, there could be billions of dollars on the sidelines,” said a hedge fund lawyer.
And in the end the trade may simply be too tempting to resist, especially given that Argentina will have to pay up if it wants to keep investors satisfied and sell more deals later on down the road.
Despite its rising credit profile, Argentina will likely have to pay a premium to Brazil, which has now fallen fully into junk territory.
Some investors think an Argentina 10-year bond should come as high as eight percent or more, while Brazil’s benchmark 2025s are being quoted at 6.5 percent.
“If it comes at eight percent, I would definitively look at the transaction carefully,” said Newman. “Argentina is still not out of the woods. People will turn their lenses on inflation and fiscal reform. You can't ignore these things, and that is why you need to price at the high end.”

Venezuela und Argentinien hatte auch schon stabile Währungen....

Flatex: PDVSA-Sinker-17 ....innerhalb 14 Tagen ca 4.500 USD Kursgewinn.....not so bad...


Griechenland: IWF rechnet mit Zahlungsschwierigkeiten ab Ende März

Griechenland Euro

Griechenland: IWF rechnet mit Zahlungsschwierigkeiten ab Ende März

Wenig überraschend kommt die Warnung des IWF, dass Griechenland bereits Ende des kommenden Monats Schwierigkeiten haben wird, weiterhin den Schuldendienst leisten zu können.
Von Redaktion/dts
Der Internationale Währungsfonds (IWF) rechnet damit, dass Griechenland bereits ab Ende März Schwierigkeiten haben wird, seine Schulden zu bedienen. Besondere Sorgen bereitet dem IWF die Bereitschaft vieler EU-Länder, den Griechen angesichts der Belastungen durch die aktuelle Flüchtlingskrise bei den Sparauflagen im Rahmen des dritten Rettungspakets stärker entgegenzukommen, berichtet der "Spiegel".
Das könnte zum Beispiel die Umsetzung der umstrittenen Rentenreform betreffen. Der IWF beharrt auf den Reformversprechen der Griechen und blockiert den längst fälligen Fortschrittsbericht, der grünes Licht geben muss, damit sich der Währungsfonds am dritten Rettungspaket beteiligt, schreibt das Nachrichtenmagazin. Die IWF-Experten weisen demnach darauf hin, dass die Griechen dauerhafte Haushaltsüberschüsse von 3,5 Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts im Jahr versprochen haben. Weil es den Griechen nicht gelinge, die Wohlhabenden ausreichend zu besteuern, müssten die Renten gekürzt werden.
Allerdings war schon von Anfang an klar, dass die ganzen "Sparmaßnahmen" samt Steuererhöhungen angesichts der lahmenden Binnenkonjunktur rein gar nichts bringen und Griechenland ohne eine umfassende Umschuldung inklusive eines Schuldenschnitts und enormen Zahlungserleichterungen bald schon erneut vor dem finanziellen Zusammenbruch stehen würde. Zudem ist es absolut utopisch zu glauben, ein strauchelndes Land könne dauerhaft 3,5 Prozent des BIP an Budgetüberschuss erwirtschaften um damit Auslandsschulden zu bedienen. Einen solchen finanziellen Abfluss hält keine Volkswirtschaft auf Dauer aus.