das Video - Bondboard - gesehen, indem Junkers wörtlich sagte, die Eurogruppe hat sich im Vorfeld des PSI von GR die Versicherung geben lassen, dass GR bei dem PSI ausnamslos alle - also auch die Unfreiwilligen - einbeziehen wird.
wer kann das video verlinken...den Kommentar habe ich in das HauptPosting geholt, weil er mir wichtig erscheint!!
der link ist kaputt....
Hilfe von Aldy:
Das Video ist von der Press Conference Eurogroup vom 12.03.2012.
So ist es leichter zu finden als mit irgendwelchen temporären Links.
(Aldy)
Sonntag, 1. April 2012
ein Grossteil der foreign law bonds kann wohl sofort fällig gestellt werden....
da ja der Bondholder Act (Law 4050/12) verabschiedet wurde und geCACt hat.
AnonymousMar 1, 2012 05:22 AM
That is interesting, because in the bonds under greek government law is the following definition of Events of default:
If any of the following events (“Events of Default”) occurs:
.....
(d) any government order, decree or enactment shall be made whereby the Republic is prevented from observing and performing in full its obligations contained in the Notes,
then the holder for the time being of any Note may give notice in writing to the Republic that such Note is immediately due and payable whereupon such Note shall become immediately due and payable at its principal amount together with the greater of an amount calculated in accordance with the provisions set out under “Amount due on Maturity” above as if references to the Maturity Date were to the date of repayment referred to in this paragraph and its principal amount, together with, in either case, accrued interest to the date of repayment unless prior to such time all Events of Default in respect of the Notes shall have been cured.
But this could mean only if the law is used, it is a default. Let's see what will happen during the next week.
ReplyIf any of the following events (“Events of Default”) occurs:
.....
(d) any government order, decree or enactment shall be made whereby the Republic is prevented from observing and performing in full its obligations contained in the Notes,
then the holder for the time being of any Note may give notice in writing to the Republic that such Note is immediately due and payable whereupon such Note shall become immediately due and payable at its principal amount together with the greater of an amount calculated in accordance with the provisions set out under “Amount due on Maturity” above as if references to the Maturity Date were to the date of repayment referred to in this paragraph and its principal amount, together with, in either case, accrued interest to the date of repayment unless prior to such time all Events of Default in respect of the Notes shall have been cured.
But this could mean only if the law is used, it is a default. Let's see what will happen during the next week.
http://andreaskoutras.blogspot.de/2012/03/unofficial-translation-of-law-4050.html
***ISIN for the bonds secretly exchanged with the ECB are GR0108008476 and GR0120005161 ***
Autor: rolfjkoch
Datum: 24.02.2012, 11:06
info von Montetitoli zur Handelbarkeit:
info von Montetitoli zur Handelbarkeit:
| GR0110024263 | HELLENIC REPUBLIC | 20.05.2012 |
| GR0120005161 | HELLENIC REPUBLIC | 22.10.2012 |
XLS]
15 Mar 2012 – 4911, 4906, GR0110024263, HELLENIC REPUBLIC, 5/20/12. 4912, 4907, GR0110026284, HELLENIC REPUBLIC, 8/20/12. 4913, 4908 ...
Foglio1 - Monte Titoli
www.montetitoli.com/.../elencostrumentifinanziari15032012xls.en.xl...
Dateiformat: Microsoft Excel15 Mar 2012 – 4911, 4906, GR0110024263, HELLENIC REPUBLIC, 5/20/12. 4912, 4907, GR0110026284, HELLENIC REPUBLIC, 8/20/12. 4913, 4908 ...
***ISIN for the bonds secretly exchanged with the ECB are GR0108008476 and GR0120005161 ***
zur Durchführung allfälliger Anfechtungen etc notwendig
zur Durchführung allfälliger Anfechtungen etc notwendig
Zypern-Anleihen...unsere neue Spielwiese ?
Name   | WKN | Börse Uhrzeit | Kurs Veränderung | Handelsvolumen (Stk.) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ZYPERN, REPUBLIK EO-MEDIUM-TERM NOTES 2004(14) | A0DAA7 | Frankfurt 30.03.2012 09:10 |  80,91 %+0,00% | 0 | |
| ZYPERN, REPUBLIK EO-MEDIUM-TERM NOTES 2009(13) | A1AHJL | London Stock Exchange 20.03.2012 15:49 |  89,50 % +4,07% | 7.000.000 | |
| ZYPERN, REPUBLIK EO-MEDIUM-TERM NOTES 2010(15) | A1A238 | London Stock Exchange 15.09.2011 17:23 | 69,00 % +0,00% | 19.000 | |
| ZYPERN, REPUBLIK EO-MEDIUM-TERM NOTES 2010(20) | A1AS1P | London Stock Exchange 02.09.2011 11:40 |  63,00 % +0,80% | 190.000 |
IIF Staff Note: Confidential February 18, 2012 Implications of a Disorderly Greek Default and Euro Exit im Netz
IIF Staff Note: Confidential February 18, 2012
1
Implications of a Disorderly Greek Default and Euro Exit
Summary
There are some very important and damaging ramifications that would result from a
disorderly default on Greek government debt. Most directly, it would impose significant
further damage on an already beleaguered Greek economy, raising serious social costs.
The most obvious immediate spillover it that it would put a major question mark against
the quality of a sizeable amount of Greek private sector liabilities.
For the official sector in the rest of the Euro Area, however, the contingent liabilities that
could result would seem to be:
o Direct losses on Greek debt holdings (€73 billion) that would probably result from
a generalized default on Greek debt (owed to both private and public sector
creditors);
o Sizeable potential losses by the ECB: we estimate that ECB exposure to Greece
(€177 billion) is over 200% of the ECB’s capital base;
o The likely need to provide substantial additional support to both Portugal and
Ireland (government and well as banks) to convince market participants that these
countries were indeed fully insulated from Greece (possibly a combined €380
billion over a 5 year horizon);
o The likely need to provide substantial support to Spain and Italy to stem
contagion there (possibly another €350 billion of combined support from the
EFSF/ESM and IMF);
o The ECB would be directly damaged by a Greek default, but would come under
pressure to significantly expand its SMP (currently €219 billion) to support
sovereign debt markets;
o There would be sizeable bank recapitalization costs, which could easily be €160
billion. Private investors would be very leery to provide additional equity, thus
leaving governments with the choice of either funding the equity themselves, or
seeing banks achieve improved ratios through even sharper deleveraging;
o There would be lost tax revenues from weaker Euro Area growth and higher
interest payments from higher debt levels implied in providing additional lending;
o There would be lower tax revenues resulting from lower global growth. The
global growth implications of a disorderly default are, ex ante, hard to quantify.
Lehman Brothers was far smaller than Greece and its demise was supposedly well
anticipated. It is very hard to be confident about how producers and consumers in
the Euro Area and beyond will respond when such an extreme event as a
disorderly sovereign default occurs.
It is difficult to add all these contingent liabilities up with any degree of precision,
although it is hard to see how they would not exceed €1 trillion.
Scribd
1
Implications of a Disorderly Greek Default and Euro Exit
Summary
There are some very important and damaging ramifications that would result from a
disorderly default on Greek government debt. Most directly, it would impose significant
further damage on an already beleaguered Greek economy, raising serious social costs.
The most obvious immediate spillover it that it would put a major question mark against
the quality of a sizeable amount of Greek private sector liabilities.
For the official sector in the rest of the Euro Area, however, the contingent liabilities that
could result would seem to be:
o Direct losses on Greek debt holdings (€73 billion) that would probably result from
a generalized default on Greek debt (owed to both private and public sector
creditors);
o Sizeable potential losses by the ECB: we estimate that ECB exposure to Greece
(€177 billion) is over 200% of the ECB’s capital base;
o The likely need to provide substantial additional support to both Portugal and
Ireland (government and well as banks) to convince market participants that these
countries were indeed fully insulated from Greece (possibly a combined €380
billion over a 5 year horizon);
o The likely need to provide substantial support to Spain and Italy to stem
contagion there (possibly another €350 billion of combined support from the
EFSF/ESM and IMF);
o The ECB would be directly damaged by a Greek default, but would come under
pressure to significantly expand its SMP (currently €219 billion) to support
sovereign debt markets;
o There would be sizeable bank recapitalization costs, which could easily be €160
billion. Private investors would be very leery to provide additional equity, thus
leaving governments with the choice of either funding the equity themselves, or
seeing banks achieve improved ratios through even sharper deleveraging;
o There would be lost tax revenues from weaker Euro Area growth and higher
interest payments from higher debt levels implied in providing additional lending;
o There would be lower tax revenues resulting from lower global growth. The
global growth implications of a disorderly default are, ex ante, hard to quantify.
Lehman Brothers was far smaller than Greece and its demise was supposedly well
anticipated. It is very hard to be confident about how producers and consumers in
the Euro Area and beyond will respond when such an extreme event as a
disorderly sovereign default occurs.
It is difficult to add all these contingent liabilities up with any degree of precision,
although it is hard to see how they would not exceed €1 trillion.
Scribd
gabs durch Euroclear schon Ende 2011 greek bond swaps ?
September 2002 war eine Zinszahlung der Ukraine fällig. Sie kam nur teilweise pünktlich, da Norsk Hydro Geld beim payingagent Deutsche Bank London gepfändet hatte
Dies ist ein gutes Beispiel dafür, dass gegen Sovereigns erfolgreich vollstreckt werden kann !!!
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Die Eurogruppe hat sogar explizit darauf gepocht, dass Griechenland ihnen versichert dass keine einzige Privatperson direkt oder indirekt entschädigt wird (im Video 2:00 sagt dazu Jean-Claude Juncker : "We received assurances from the Greek Authorities, that means the Finance Minister, and he is a Greek Authority, that there will be no compensation, either direct or indirect, to any bondohlder. This is an essential point because if Greece would allow private bondholders to be compensated we would have to face the same problem in all the member states of the Euro area...") Als Eurozone Bürger kann man nach so einem ungerechten Vorgehen seitens der Eurogruppe sein Recht nur bei Zivil-Gerichten finden. Bei einem Schuldenschnitt von 53.5% (Merkel hatte sogar einen Schnitt von 60% für ihr ja bei dem 2em Rettungspacket Griechenlands verlangt).
Das ist wohl eindeutig.
Damit können wir dem Bund vorsätzlichen Vertrags- und Verfassungsbruch nachweisen!!!