03-18-18 rolf a 1 million USD Depotperformance (on the chart in EUR) 2012 +24% 2013 +8% 2014 +26% 2015 +48% 2016 +43% the decline in absolute values are due to taxpaying https://rolfscarpevigoblog.blogspot.de/2018/03/performance-2012-bis-ende-2016in-farbe.html

Sonntag, 18. März 2018

03-18-18 rolf a 1 million USD Depotperformance (on the chart in EUR) 2012 +24% 2013 +8% 2014 +26% 2015 +48% 2016 +43% the decline in absolute values are due to taxpaying https://rolfscarpevigoblog.blogspot.de/2018/03/performance-2012-bis-ende-2016in-farbe.html

03-18-18  rolf a 1 million USD Depotperformance (on the chart in EUR) 2012 +24% 2013 +8% 2014 +26% 2015 +48% 2016 +43% the decline in absolute values are due to taxpaying https://rolfscarpevigoblog.blogspot.de/2018/03/performance-2012-bis-ende-2016in-farbe.html

performance 2012 bis ende 2016.....in farbe siehts doch besser aus

not so bad

By April 2012, the last of Greece's exchanged or amended foreign-law bonds had settled, with near complete participation (97%). Holders of €6.4bn in face value held out (Gulati et al, 2013)

Greece (2008-2012) Although some would argue that Greece's debt crisis and subsequent restructuring in 2012, which set a new world record for restructured debt volume (€200bn), can be traced back to 2001, when Greece joined the euro and afterwards saw its interest rates and risk premia compress sharply (premia almost disappeared), we date Greece's debt problem as beginning in 2008. This was the year that saw the initiation of an EU excessive deficit procedure for Greece (officially binding from 2009), as its general government deficit exceeded 4% of GDP (later to be revised up to 9.8%). Public debt, meanwhile, started to rise rapidly from an already high level of 97% of GDP in 2008 (later revised up to 109%) to an even higher one within two years of 146%, with 2008 marking the onset of the debt problem for Greece on this basis according to our dating criterion. The subsequent aggressive unfolding of the Greek debt crisis is well known. Bad economic news stacked up, eroding market confidence in Greece and its debt sustainability and resulting in a number of credit rating downgrades. A three year rescue package was agreed in May 2010. After a phase of concerted fiscal 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Greece: public debt (percent of GDP) Start IMF program Annoucement Exchange Market reaccess 20 40 60 80 100 120 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Algeria: public debt (percent of GDP) Start IMF program Annoucement Exchange Market reaccess 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 St.Kitts Nevis: public debt (percent GDP) Start IMF program = Annoucement Exchange 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Argentina: public debt (percent of GDP) Start IMF program Annoucement Exchange = Market reaccess 15 adjustment under the programme, consolidation then slowed amid a deepening recession and growing domestic opposition to the programme. In October 2011, an official statement from euro zone leaders invited private holders of Greek debt to a voluntary bond exchange. By April 2012, the last of Greece's exchanged or amended foreign-law bonds had settled, with near complete participation (97%). Holders of €6.4bn in face value held out (Gulati et al, 2013)

Was ist denn das für ein Sumpf in den wohl auch die SdK verwickelt ist

Kremlin AG: Stellungnahme zur abgesagten Hauptversammlung

Steinheim (pta039/28.04.2017/16:36) - Der Vorstand der Kremlin AG hat am 03.04.2017 die Hauptversammlung der Kremlin AG am 07.04.2017 abgesagt.

Aussender: Kremlin AG Hochfeldweg 21 89555 Steinheim Deutschland Ansprechpartner: Georg Engels Tel.: +49 7329 2512005 E-Mail: info@kremlin-aktie.de Website: www.kremlin-aktie.de ISIN(s): DE000A1PHFR2 (Aktie) Börsen: Regulierter Markt in Hamburg; Freiverkehr in München; Freiverkehr in Berlin

it is very important to buy foreign law bonds !!

it is very important to buy foreign law bonds !! Greece 2011-to date: The biggest recent success of holdout creditors (Argentina aside) followed the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. As of 2011 more than 10% of Greece’s stock of bonds was governed under foreign law and could therefore not be exchanged via the retrofit CACs that were used for the Greek-law bonds prior to the March 2012 exchange. Large shares of the foreign-law bonds were reportedly purchased by distressed debt investors as the crisis deepened, often building blocking positions that would prevent a majority-imposed exchange of the bonds via existing CACs.54 In 2011 and 2012 several hedge funds threatened to file suit against Greece should the government not service them in full.55 When the exchange of the foreign-law bonds finally closed in April 2012, CACs had failed for most of the series. The result was a total of e6.4 bn in holdouts (see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013). At the time of writing, Greece continues to pay these holdouts in full and on time, i.e. redeeming 100% of face value, with no haircut, and resulting in e4.1 bn less debt relief compared to a situation without holdouts (more than 2% of 2012 GDP). Concerns about litigation in the UK and elsewhere have been described as a main reason why Greece repaid the holdouts, also because the government intended to re-access bond markets soon after the restructuring Greece 2011-to date: The biggest recent success of holdout creditors (Argentina aside) followed the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. As of 2011 more than 10% of Greece’s stock of bonds was governed under foreign law and could therefore not be exchanged via the retrofit CACs that were used for the Greek-law bonds prior to the March 2012 exchange. Large shares of the foreign-law bonds were reportedly purchased by distressed debt investors as the crisis deepened, often building blocking positions that would prevent a majority-imposed exchange of the bonds via existing CACs.54 In 2011 and 2012 several hedge funds threatened to file suit against Greece should the government not service them in full.55 When the exchange of the foreign-law bonds finally closed in April 2012, CACs had failed for most of the series. The result was a total of e6.4 bn in holdouts (see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013). At the time of writing, Greece continues to pay these holdouts in full and on time, i.e. redeeming 100% of face value, with no haircut, and resulting in e4.1 bn less debt relief compared to a situation without holdouts (more than 2% of 2012 GDP). Concerns about litigation in the UK and elsewhere have been described as a main reason why Greece repaid the holdouts, also because the government intended to re-access bond markets soon after the restructuring Greece 2011-to date: The biggest recent success of holdout creditors (Argentina aside) followed the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. As of 2011 more than 10% of Greece’s stock of bonds was governed under foreign law and could therefore not be exchanged via the retrofit CACs that were used for the Greek-law bonds prior to the March 2012 exchange. Large shares of the foreign-law bonds were reportedly purchased by distressed debt investors as the crisis deepened, often building blocking positions that would prevent a majority-imposed exchange of the bonds via existing CACs.54 In 2011 and 2012 several hedge funds threatened to file suit against Greece should the government not service them in full.55 When the exchange of the foreign-law bonds finally closed in April 2012, CACs had failed for most of the series. The result was a total of e6.4 bn in holdouts (see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013). At the time of writing, Greece continues to pay these holdouts in full and on time, i.e. redeeming 100% of face value, with no haircut, and resulting in e4.1 bn less debt relief compared to a situation without holdouts (more than 2% of 2012 GDP). Concerns about litigation in the UK and elsewhere have been described as a main reason why Greece repaid the holdouts, also because the government intended to re-access bond markets soon after the restructuring page 47 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2135.en.pdf

Einlösung von Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen ist nicht steuerbar Urteil vom 6.2.2018 IX R 33/17

Mittwoch, 14. März 2018

Einlösung von Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen ist nicht steuerbar Urteil vom 6.2.2018 IX R 33/17

Nr. 15 vom 14. März 2018

Einlösung von Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen ist nicht steuerbar

Urteil vom 6.2.2018   IX R 33/17

Die Einlösung von Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen, die dem Inhaber ein Recht auf die Auslieferung von Gold gewähren, unterliegt nicht der Einkommensteuer. Dies hat der Bundesfinanzhof (BFH) mit Urteil vom 6. Februar 2018 IX R 33/17 entschieden.

Bei Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen handelt es sich um börsenfähige Wertpapiere. Diese gewähren dem Inhaber das Recht auf Auslieferung eines Gramms Gold, das jederzeit unter Einhaltung einer Lieferfrist von zehn Tagen gegenüber der Bank geltend gemacht werden kann. Daneben besteht die Möglichkeit, die Wertpapiere an der Börse zu handeln. Zur Besicherung und Erfüllbarkeit der Auslieferungsansprüche war die Inhaberschuldverschreibung jederzeit durch physisch eingelagertes Gold zu mindestens 95 % gedeckt.

Die Kläger erwarben Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen und ließen sich das verbriefte Gold innerhalb eines Jahres nach dem Erwerb physisch aushändigen. Das Finanzamt (FA) besteuerte die Wertsteigerung im Zeitraum zwischen dem Erwerb der Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen und der Auslieferung des physischen Goldes als Einkünfte aus privaten Veräußerungsgeschäften i.S. von § 22 Nr. 2, § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 2 des Einkommensteuergesetzes (EStG). Die dagegen erhobene Klage war vor dem Finanzgericht erfolgreich.

Der BFH hat die Revision des FA als unbegründet zurückgewiesen.

Nach dem Urteil des BFH haben die Kläger durch die innerhalb eines Jahres nach dem Erwerb der Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen erfolgte Einlösung mit Auslieferung des physischen Goldes keine Veräußerung i.S. des § 22 Nr. 2 EStG i.V.m. § 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 Nr. 2 EStG verwirklicht. Es fehlt an der entgeltlichen Übertragung der angeschafften Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen, weil die Kläger lediglich ihren verbrieften Anspruch auf Lieferung des Goldes eingelöst und gegen Rückgabe der Inhaberschuldverschreibungen ihr Gold empfangen haben. Hierdurch habe sich ihre wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit nicht gesteigert, da sie auch danach das Risiko eines fallenden Goldpreises trugen. Das ausgelieferte Gold befand sich im Eigentum der Kläger und wurde in ihrem Bankdepot verwahrt. Eine Veräußerung des gelieferten Goldes habe nicht stattgefunden.

Die zwischen dem Erwerb der Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen und der Auslieferung physischen Goldes eingetretenen Wertsteigerungen führten auch nicht zu steuerbaren Einkünften aus Kapitalvermögen, da die Schuldverschreibungen keine Kapitalforderungen verbrieften, sondern Ansprüche auf die Lieferung physischen Goldes.

Nicht zu entscheiden hatte der BFH Im Streitfall über die Veräußerung oder Verwertung der Xetra-Gold Inhaberschuldverschreibungen an der Börse oder an andere Erwerber.

Bundesfinanzhof
Pressestelle      Tel. (089) 9231-400
Pressereferent  Tel. (089) 9231-300

letzte Umsätze ELECAR laut FINRA

Venezuelan Debt: Further Thoughts on “Why Not Accelerate and Sue Venezuela Now?” posted by Mark Weidemaier Mitu Gulati and Mark Weidemaier

Venezuelan Debt: Further Thoughts on “Why Not Accelerate and Sue Venezuela Now?”

posted by Mark Weidemaier

Mitu Gulati and Mark Weidemaier

Earlier, we posted about whether holders of Venezuelan bonds would be better off accelerating and obtaining judgments sooner rather than later. In a nutshell, here was the point:

When a restructuring comes (and it will), the two primary weapons the restructurer is likely to use are CACs and Exit Consents. A bondholder who obtains a money judgment, as best we can tell, escapes the threat of either CACs or Exit Consents being used against her.

We heard from a number of people with questions prompted by the post. Here are some of them, and our conjectures as to answers.

1. Is there really no precedent for using contract terms to “unwind” a judgment?

We don’t know of any. As mentioned in our earlier post, it is clear that some contract rights survive the judgment. This includes the pari passu clause, according to Judge Griesa’s opinion in the NML litigation, which allowed bondholders with money judgments to assert a new claim for injunctive relief under that clause.

On the other hand, the pari passu clause isn’t a great analogy here. Among other reasons, it was used in the NML litigation to give a new remedy to creditors who already held money judgments. What we’re looking for is a case where other parties (either the judgment debtor or other creditors) used contract rights to negate or modify a judgment obtained through litigation. We know of no authority examining the use of CACs or Exit Consents, so we looked a bit farther afield. What about acceleration rights?

Bonds issued under a trust indenture, like PDVSA’s bonds, typically allow a creditor minority (usually 25%) to instruct the trustee to accelerate. After acceleration, the trustee usually conducts the litigation, but there are some situations in which individual bondholders can sue. Importantly, a typical indenture also allows a creditor majority to rescind a declaration of acceleration. What if such a rescission happens after one or more individual bondholders have obtained money judgments?

For readers interested in this topic generally, we’d recommend a September 2016 article in Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law called “Trust Indentures and Sovereign Bonds: Who Can Sue,” by Lee Buchheit and Sofia Martos, both experts in the field. The article also includes this fascinating quote from the commentary to the American Bar Foundation’s model indenture provisions:

By the terms of the indenture, an acceleration of maturity can always be annulled by the holders of a majority in amount of the debentures. The procuring of a judgment by a few debentureholders on the basis of the accelerated maturity and a subsequent rescission of acceleration would present a most difficult problem whose solution is not to be found in any decided case.  

A most difficult problem indeed! It apparently wasn’t clear to the drafters of the ABF model indenture provisions whether a creditor majority could de-accelerate a bondholder’s claim after it has been reduced to judgment, and we haven’t found anything since to clarify the question. But perhaps some of our readers know of something we have missed? (For readers with access to the ABF Commentaries, the quote is on pp. 234-35).

2. What about my interest rate? What am I earning on unpaid interest and principal if I get a judgment?

This is what investors seem to really care about – and perhaps for good reason, because interest rates differ as a function of whether one obtains a judgment. These differences may explain why investors would prefer to defer litigation. With the important caveat that we are not experts on these questions, our sense is that, after an investor reduces her claim to a judgment, that claim will accrue interest at an unattractive rate.

More particularly, if the bond says (and most do) that interest will accrue at the contractual rate "until the principal is paid in full," then:

1. Interest continues to accrue on principal post-maturity/acceleration at the contract rate, and

2. Interest will accrue on unpaid amounts of interest post-maturity/acceleration at the 9 percent NY statutory rate (until judgment). Once a judgment is handed down, the judgment will bear interest at the federal statutory rate (which is more like 3 percent -- it floats based on US Treasury rates).

The differences between contract and statutory interest can be dramatic, especially post-judgment. That can provide some incentive to delay litigation, although delay can also backfire.

There were echoes of this tension after Argentina’s default. Those who followed that crisis may recall significant differences in the strategies holdout creditors pursued. For example, Dart got judgments early, thereby protecting itself from Argentina’s possible use of Exit Consents. NML, by contrast, waited somewhat longer, often to spectacular effect. Some readers may recall the infamous FRANs, which yielded spectacular returns to NML. (The FRANSs are described by Matt Levine of Bloomberg here; also note the fun graph depicting the significance of computing interest at the contract rather than the statutory rate).

Ultimately, waiting proved advantageous for NML, although it might have regretted its decision if Argentina had used Exit Consents to modify the bond contracts before judgment. But then, perhaps the fact that Dart had already obtained money judgments discouraged the use of Exit Consents…?

At this stage, it is hard for us to see Venezuela abjuring the use Exit Consents. That said, if enough holders get judgments, the value of using Exit Consents diminishes. And if the end result is that Exit Consents are not used, then the ones to gain the most will be those who waited longest.

March 12, 2018 at 9:25 AM in Sovereign Debt

Argentine Secretary of Finance Santiago Bausili.

• Print

February 22, 2018 9:59 am JST

Argentina to make good on defaulted samurai bonds

Stiffed creditors will receive 50% premium on debt, says finance secretary

NAOYUKI TOYAMA, Nikkei staff writer

Argentine Secretary of Finance Santiago Bausili.

BUENOS AIRES, Argentina -- The government of Argentina, in a bid to settle a long dispute with holdout creditors, will soon detail a plan to pay back about 2.8 billion yen ($26 million) worth of samurai bonds that have been in default. 

"The Argentine government is building relationships with Japan, G-7 and G-20 countries," Secretary of Finance Santiago Bausili told The Nikkei in Buenos Aires. He said the remaining bonds will be redeemed at 150% of the principal. In Argentina, the finance secretary is a deputy of the finance minister.

The settlement revolves around samurai bonds, or yen-denominated debt floated by non-Japanese borrowers, that Argentina issued between 1996 and 2000. A financial crisis forced Argentina to default on a portion of the bonds in 2001.

Argentina later carried out bond exchange programs that heavily discounted the principal. About 98% of the creditors agreed to those terms.

But Japanese lenders Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Mizuho Bank and Shinsei Bank, acting in their capacity as credit asset management firms, have stood their ground against the swap, taking legal action against Argentina.  

"Not all bond holders are rejecting [the plan]," Bausili said. "Many of them have not been made aware of the proposal." Argentina will meet with creditors to gain approval for the settlement proposal, with the aim of putting an end to the court battle.

Mauricio Macri won the presidential election in 2015 by vowing to bring Argentina back into the fold of international financial markets, in a break with the previous leftist government. Those efforts include resolving debt that has been in default. In 2016, aggrieved U.S. hedge funds agreed to a repayment package worth billions of dollars.

The Macri administration is also looking to attract international investors, but Japanese corporations have been slow to respond. Argentina hopes the samurai bond settlement offer will serve as a good-faith appeal to the Japanese side. "I am sure that [through] efforts to resolve these issues ... we can attract Japanese investment," Bausili added. 

zum Thema "Berufskläger"

„RECHTSMISSBRAUCH“BGH weist Berufskläger in die Schranken

Der Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) geht mit einem Beschluss gegen sogenannte Berufskläger vor. Experten sehen dies als wegweisend an: So können sich Aktiengesellschaften nun leichter gegen solche Kleinaktionäre wehren, die Maßnahmen von Unternehmen systematisch mit Klagen blockieren.

 Anke Rezmer

01.09.2010 - 13:18 Uhr Kommentieren 

Der Bundesgerichtshof hat dem Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt "Recht gegeben": Die Frankfurter Richter hatten die Anfechtungsklage eines bekannten Berufsklägers gegen ein Unternehmen abgewiesen.

(Foto: dpa)

FRANKFURT. Das Karlsruher Gericht hat mit seinem Beschluss im August in letzter Instanz erwirkt, dass ein deutscher Berufskläger zum ersten Mal Schadenersatz leisten muss. Der bekannte Kläger und Berliner Umzugsunternehmer, Klaus Zapf, hatte sich beim BGH gegen ein Urteil des Oberlandesgerichts Frankfurt (OLG) beschwert. Die Frankfurter Richter hatten seine Anfechtungsklage gegen ein Unternehmen abgewiesen (Az: 5U 183/07). Der BGH hat dem OLG nach eigener Aussage nun „Recht gegeben“ und Zapfs Beschwerde gegen die Nichtzulassung einer Revision abgewiesen.

Durch diesen Beschluss wird ein Urteil des Landgerichts Frankfurt aus dem Jahr 2007 rechtskräftig, dass die Anfechtungsklage Zapfs für „sittenwidrig“ hält und den Unternehmer wegen „Rechtsmissbrauchs“ zu Schadensersatz verurteilt. Zapf und Mitkläger hatten von der damaligen Nanoinvest AG, die heute Real Estate International heißt, 3 500 Bezugsrechte für neue Aktien für die Rücknahme ihrer Klage gefordert. Besessen haben die Kleinaktionäre gemeinsam aber nur 53 Aktien. Das OLG hatte das Urteil 2009 bestätigt.

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BEWUSSTES MITEINANDER

Bitte nicht falsch verstehen!

Deutsche Kommunikations- und Verhaltensweisen können zu Irritationen führen. Im schlimmsten Fall kommt es zu Missverständnissen, die eine Zusammenarbeit unmöglich machen. Fünf Situationen, die sich leicht vermeiden lasse Mehr...

Nun wird in einem weiteren Verfahren ermittelt, wie viel Zapf zahlen muss. Bernd Nenninger von der Kanzlei KNP Dr. Nenninger, Penatzer & Krins, der Real Estate International vertritt, rechnet „mindestens mit einem sechsstelligen Betrag“. Der BGH-Beschluss werde den rund 40 Berufsklägern im Land das Leben schwerer machen, meinen Juristen. Unternehmen könnten sich bestärkt fühlen, gegen Blockierer von Hauptversammlungsbeschlüssen vorzugehen. Typische Anfechtungsklagen richten sich gegen Kapitalerhöhungen oder Fusionen. Berufskläger gingen bereits selektiver vor, so Nenninger. Sie wüssten nun, dass Klagen teuer werden können.

ARG96......nein es ist die 3.375 ARG REP 17-20 ARG17