it is very important to buy foreign law bonds !!

it is very important to buy foreign law bonds !! Greece 2011-to date: The biggest recent success of holdout creditors (Argentina aside) followed the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. As of 2011 more than 10% of Greece’s stock of bonds was governed under foreign law and could therefore not be exchanged via the retrofit CACs that were used for the Greek-law bonds prior to the March 2012 exchange. Large shares of the foreign-law bonds were reportedly purchased by distressed debt investors as the crisis deepened, often building blocking positions that would prevent a majority-imposed exchange of the bonds via existing CACs.54 In 2011 and 2012 several hedge funds threatened to file suit against Greece should the government not service them in full.55 When the exchange of the foreign-law bonds finally closed in April 2012, CACs had failed for most of the series. The result was a total of e6.4 bn in holdouts (see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013). At the time of writing, Greece continues to pay these holdouts in full and on time, i.e. redeeming 100% of face value, with no haircut, and resulting in e4.1 bn less debt relief compared to a situation without holdouts (more than 2% of 2012 GDP). Concerns about litigation in the UK and elsewhere have been described as a main reason why Greece repaid the holdouts, also because the government intended to re-access bond markets soon after the restructuring Greece 2011-to date: The biggest recent success of holdout creditors (Argentina aside) followed the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. As of 2011 more than 10% of Greece’s stock of bonds was governed under foreign law and could therefore not be exchanged via the retrofit CACs that were used for the Greek-law bonds prior to the March 2012 exchange. Large shares of the foreign-law bonds were reportedly purchased by distressed debt investors as the crisis deepened, often building blocking positions that would prevent a majority-imposed exchange of the bonds via existing CACs.54 In 2011 and 2012 several hedge funds threatened to file suit against Greece should the government not service them in full.55 When the exchange of the foreign-law bonds finally closed in April 2012, CACs had failed for most of the series. The result was a total of e6.4 bn in holdouts (see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013). At the time of writing, Greece continues to pay these holdouts in full and on time, i.e. redeeming 100% of face value, with no haircut, and resulting in e4.1 bn less debt relief compared to a situation without holdouts (more than 2% of 2012 GDP). Concerns about litigation in the UK and elsewhere have been described as a main reason why Greece repaid the holdouts, also because the government intended to re-access bond markets soon after the restructuring Greece 2011-to date: The biggest recent success of holdout creditors (Argentina aside) followed the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. As of 2011 more than 10% of Greece’s stock of bonds was governed under foreign law and could therefore not be exchanged via the retrofit CACs that were used for the Greek-law bonds prior to the March 2012 exchange. Large shares of the foreign-law bonds were reportedly purchased by distressed debt investors as the crisis deepened, often building blocking positions that would prevent a majority-imposed exchange of the bonds via existing CACs.54 In 2011 and 2012 several hedge funds threatened to file suit against Greece should the government not service them in full.55 When the exchange of the foreign-law bonds finally closed in April 2012, CACs had failed for most of the series. The result was a total of e6.4 bn in holdouts (see Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013). At the time of writing, Greece continues to pay these holdouts in full and on time, i.e. redeeming 100% of face value, with no haircut, and resulting in e4.1 bn less debt relief compared to a situation without holdouts (more than 2% of 2012 GDP). Concerns about litigation in the UK and elsewhere have been described as a main reason why Greece repaid the holdouts, also because the government intended to re-access bond markets soon after the restructuring page 47 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2135.en.pdf