der Erfinder der retroactive CAC Buchheit (cgsh) und Athens Berater bei der ZwangsCACerei hat bereits in seinem Papier vom 7.5.2010 auf die Rechts-und Verfassungswidrigkeit dieses Konzeptes hingewiesen // das gehört in jede Klage hinein !!!

Even the relatively mild step of facilitating a debt restructuring
through the passage of a Mopping-Up Law of some kind, however, could
draw a legal challenge. In the case of Greece, such a challenge could come
from three possible sources.

The first is Article 17 of the Greek Constitution.
That Article declares that no one shall be deprived of property “except for
public benefit” and conditional upon payment of full compensation
corresponding to the value of the expropriated property. The question, it
seems to us (non-Greek lawyers that we are), is whether a mandatory
alteration of the payment terms of a local law Greek bond in the context of a
generalized debt restructuring could be said to impair the value of that bond;
an instrument that, in the absence of a successful restructuring, would have
in any event been highly impaired in value. Also of possible relevance may
be Article 106 of the Greek Constitution which gives the State broad powers
to “consolidate social peace and protect the general interest.”


A second source of possible legal concern might lie in the
European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols. Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 protects the right to the “peaceful enjoyment of possessions”.
This right may be restricted only in the public interest and only through
measures that do not impose an individual and excessive burden on the
private party. That said, Article 15 of the Convention permits measures,
otherwise inconsistent with the Convention, to deal with a “public emergency
threatening the life of the nation”.

Finally, foreign holders of local law-governed Greek bonds
subject to the Mopping-Up Law might look to Greece’s Bilateral Investment
Treaties for redress. BITs protect against expropriation without
compensation, as well as unfair and inequitable treatment. It appears that
Greece has signed more than 40 BITs with bilateral partners

S 12/13




http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1603304

How to Restructure Greek Debt

Lee C. Buchheit 

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP - New York Office

G. Mitu Gulati 

Duke University - School of Law
May 7, 2010

Abstract:      
Plan A for addressing the Greek debt crisis has taken the form of a €110 billion financial support package for Greece announced by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund on May 2, 2010. A significant part of that €110 billion, if and when it is disbursed, will be used to repay maturing Greek debt obligations, in full and on time. The success of Plan A is not inevitable; among other things, it will require the Greeks to accept - and to stick to - a harsh fiscal adjustment program for several years.

If Plan A does not prosper, what are the alternatives? And how quickly could a Plan B be mobilized and executed?

This paper outlines the elements of one possible Plan B, a restructuring of Greece’s roughly €300 billion of government debt. Prior sovereign debt restructurings provide considerable guidance for how such a restructuring might be shaped. But several key features of the Greek debt stock could make this operation significantly different from any previous sovereign debt workouts.

To be sure, a restructuring of Greek debt will not relieve the country from the painful prospect of significant fiscal adjustment, nor will it displace the need for financial support from the official sector. But it may change how some of those funds are spent (for example, backstopping the domestic banking system as opposed to paying off maturing debt in full).

This paper does not speculate about whether a restructuring of Greek debt will in fact become necessary or politically feasible. It focuses only on the how, not the whether or the when, of such a debt restructuring.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

working papers series