Gesamtzahl der Seitenaufrufe

Samstag, 21. Oktober 2017

Mit einer vernünftigen Politik ist das reversibel......


verbleibende Graceperiod


der Rückstand wächst

¿Los cupones de VENZ2025 y VENZ2026 sumarán USD 237,4 millones más a los pagos pendientes?

20 octubre, 2017
Mañana 21/10 corresponden los pagos de los intereses de los bonos globales 2025 y 2026 (VENZ2025-7,625 y VENZ2026-11,75) cuyos cupones corresponden a USD 61.196.000,25 y USD 175.250000,00 que suman un total de USD 237.443.000,25 que la república debería cancelar al término de la semana.
Los USD 237,4 millones correspondientes a esta semana, se suman a los USD 349,1 millones que siguen pendientes desde la semana pasada. Los precios de los bonos soberanos, así como los de PDVSA mantienen una tendencia a la baja, estimulado por las demoras en los pagos, afectando más a los bonos con intereses más altos, así como los resultados de los comicios electorales que mantienen en alerta a los inversionistas.

We are now 10 days into the continuing non-payment of Venezuela & PDVSA bonds, with Electricidad de Caracas being the longest failure. At today's close, there were no interest payments made on the $349 million owed so far. That "technical default" amount rises by another $237 million tomorrow, when 2 more Venezuela bond coupons are due. Those checks were not in the mail today either.

We are now 10 days into the continuing non-payment of Venezuela & PDVSA bonds, with Electricidad de Caracas being the longest failure.

At today's close, there were no interest payments made on the $349 million owed so far.

That "technical default" amount rises by another $237 million tomorrow, when 2 more Venezuela bond coupons are due.  Those checks were not in the mail today either. 

Worse still, neither Venezuela nor PDVSA have made any explanation for the non-payment.

In addition, no money of that size or magnitude signalling attempted payment has come out of reserves this month as of tonight's figures, with the reserves ending up $1 million to a supposed $10.015 billion today.

Over the last couple of weeks, we have spoken to a number of our friends and colleagues at PDVSA and the Central Bank and Finance Ministry and will be reporting more in a longer report next week.

At any rate, the widespread non-payment of a whole group of different bonds -- PDVSA, Venezuela, Electricidad de Caracas --  with a variety of different banking accounts and paymasters is a tell to us.

We'll explain more in our report next week.

As you can imagine, the widespread lack of payment -- and the lack of an explanation from PDVSA or Venezuela -- is also taking a toll on bond prices as the following closing markets show.

Good New - Bad News: 
Bad News: The widespread belief of a 30 recovery value that caused resistance to stay below that level was firmly broken today. 
Good News (except for GS):  That $2.8 billion Goldman Sachs PDVSA 6% of 2022 are now firmly below 30.  They are now bid 5 points below where Goldman bought them from the Maduro Regime in May, meaning Goldman has a $140 million loss from the whole position so far. #Schadenfreude 

Have a great weekend!

                                          --Russ

P.S.  I will be in DC and New York next week meeting with clients and I am happy to meet with you as well about any of these issues, especially what we know about Venezuela's debt payments -- or the lack of them.  I can also invite you to an event on Venezuela at which I will be speaking at the Council of the Americas on Thursday, along with brilliant Venezuelan minds Francisco Monaldi and Eric Farnsworth.  Please do get in touch!
 




Security

B Px

A Px

B YTC

A YTC

B Spd

A Spd

Fitch

Moody

S&P
Amt
Out
VENZ   13⅝  1873.50-75.5059.052/54.7285748/5315CCCaa3CCC-752.811MM
VENZ   7     1862.00-63.0058.270/56.3605669/5478CCCaa3CCC-1MMM
VENZ   7¾   1944.50-45.0058.977/58.1775740/5660CCCaa3CCC-2.496MMM
VENZ   6     2037.00-38.0045.790/44.5884408/4287CCCaa3CCC-1.5MMM
VENZ   12¾  2242.00-42.7547.352/46.5204533/4450CCCaa3CCC-3MMM
VENZ   9     2333.00-33.5039.758/39.2503774/3723CCCaa3CCC-2MMM
VENZ   8¼   2432.75-33.5033.987/33.3413160/3096CCCaa3CCC-2.496MMM
VENZ   7.65  2531.75-32.5032.324/31.6982994/2932CCCaa3CCC-1.6MMM
VENZ   11¾  2636.50-37.2535.616/34.9733324/3259CCCaa3CCC-3MMM
VENZ   9¼   2735.75-36.5029.548/29.0142717/2663CCCaa3CCC-4MMM
VENZ   9¼   2831.50-32.0032.441/31.9993006/2962CCCaa3CCC-2MMM
VENZ   11.95 3137.00-37.7533.350/32.7343097/3035CCCaa3CCC-4.2MMM
VENZ   9⅜   3432.50-33.0029.488/29.0712660/2618CCCaa3CCC-1.5MMM
VENZ   7     3830.75-31.5023.332/22.8142044/1993CCCaa3CCC-1.25MMM
PDVSA  8½   1792.25-93.00370.933/333.29536952/33188CCN.A.CCC-1.121MMM
PDVSA  8½   2082.50-83.2524.309/23.4902274/2192CCCaa3CCC-3.368MMM
PDVSA  9     2140.75-41.5049.339/48.3794762/4667CCN.A.CCC-2.394MMM
PDVSA  12¾  2242.00-42.7551.806/50.8665009/4915CCN.A.N.A.3MMM
PDVSA  6     2428.25-29.0038.187/37.3813617/3536CCN.A.CCC-5MMM
PDVSA  6     2627.75-28.5030.741/30.0922836/2771CCN.A.CCC-4.5MMM
PDVSA  5⅜   2728.25-29.0026.187/25.6452381/2326CCN.A.CCC-3MMM
PDVSA  9¾   3532.75-33.5030.335/29.6932745/2680CCCaa3N.A.3MMM
PDVSA  5½   3728.15-29.0020.699/20.1621781/1727CCN.A.CCC-1.5MMM
------
ELECAR 8½   1866.00-68.00123.977/114.00112240/11243CCN.A.CCC-650MM


Russ Dallen | Managing Partner
Caracas (58) (212) 335-1906
Miami (305) 735-8280
New York (917) 499-8346
London (44) (207) 993-4557
RMDallen@CaracasCapital.com

Freitag, 20. Oktober 2017

payment chain ist wohl holprig wg US-Sanktionen

Die Laufzeit macht den Unterschied


Venny Bull Blend: The VENZ 2027 coupon drama and what comes next

Venny Bull Blend: The VENZ 2027 coupon drama and what comes next

19
For Venny bond Bulls who still have confidence in the Republic’s willingness and capacity to service its growing pile of external debts, this past week was the ultimate test of their convictions.
For several years now, they’ve shrugged off the incalculable social costs of prioritizing debt payments over the people’s most basic needs, and the fact that the ‘kiting strategy’of getting indebted at ever higher interest rates to pay for previous credits is the very definition of unsustainable. For the last couple of months, they also had to disregard the growing threat of full-blown financial sanctions by the US government that would all but shut down the Venny Bond market.
Faced with all this, Venny Bulls are always eager to point out that “Venezuela always pays in the end”, which means they get to make bank at the expense of the skeptics, not to mention Venezuelans’ stomachs. And it happened again.
However now, there’s a twist:

‘Willing’ and ‘able’ might not be good enough anymore…

On September 15th, coupon payments on VENZ 27s came due. The Republic showed no signs of wiring the payment. We didn’t get the now-traditional cheesy tweet post about how  ‘la república cancela sus compromisos‘ from the National Office for Public Credit (ONCP) either. Market sources told me nobody had seen the coupons yet and most people are bracing for the one-month grace period in the contracts to be used for this one.
“Apparently the payment delay has everything to do with the more strict conditions on which correspondent accounts of VZ government entities are being handled,” I’m told by a local trader. It makes sense. At around $180 million, the amount owed is trivial in terms of the current stock of reserves. On the surface, this is not a capacity-to-pay issue; nor is it a willingness to pay issue (see Mr. Lobo of Carmelitas Street reinforcing this view).
They’ve shrugged off the incalculable social costs of prioritizing debt payments over the people’s most basic needs.
However, keep in mind that this is the first debt maturity since the late August announcement that imposed sanctions on Venny bond trading and clearing by US counterparties. Compliance checks are running on all cylinders now, as Wall Street banks are unwilling to risk stepping out of bounds and risking hefty fines, not to mention their brokerage licenses. These delays are showing that, beyond capacity and willingness, the actual viability of debt payments represents another layer of risk bondholders face.
Which made the third week of September… curious, to say the least. Conversations on the Street were going something along the lines of:
“So, nobody has seen the coupon on their accounts right?”
“Nope!”
“Alright, have a good weekend folks.”

When it rains in VennyLand, it pours skeletons

Monday 18th came and, still, no signs of the coupon hitting the accounts. “It’s fine, they got 30 days to sort out their mess. Vamo a calmarno…,” another fellow trader cheekily points out. What did come on Monday was a flow of increasingly dire news about the credit.
First we found out Venezuela is asking for an extension on a USD 800 MM gold-backed loan with Citi that is due in October, openly saying they don’t have the cash to amortize the loan and they don’t want to get their collateral executed.
You thought the $3.6 billion worth of bonds that PDVSA and the Republic have to pay in Oct. / Nov. was an already tricky proposition. Now, enter a claim right on the same schedule, flying under the radar and showing up at the worst possible moment.
And this is by no means the only skeleton in the closet, mind you. There are a couple other ones that are scaring the bulls out there:
$300 million Repo contract signed with Fintech Advisory earlier this year, whose terms remain shrouded in secrecy, could imaginably come due before the year’s end. However, we might speculate that Fintech has already started to do a ‘margin call’ and executing their collateral; seeing that the stock of Venny Bonds backing the repo have plunged to near all-time lows in recent weeks. They’re not in the business of speculating on the credit; their whole deal is to lend cash to a desperate government on absurd terms and with a massive amount of collateral, free to be liquidated at their discretion.
Venezuela is asking for an extension on a USD 800 MM gold-backed loan with Citi that is due in October, openly saying they don’t have the cash to amortize the loan.
There are plenty more skeletons where that came from: there are several more gold swap deals, with Deutsche Bank and Chinese state-owned banks of unknown amounts and tenors. All we know is that such deals were negotiated starting early 2016, that the government has liquidated or put up as collateral over 130 tonnes of gold since 2015, and that it took a strongly-worded letter by National Assembly chairman Julio Borges to try and stop the flow of fresh money to Maduro in exchange for mortgaging the country’s gold reserves. What we do not know is when the current loans are due.
Most worrisome of all ‘shadow’ debts are the ones acquired by state oil company PDVSA. There are promissory notes owed by PDV to critical oil service companies; depending on the source, the amount owed ranges between $2 billion and upwards of $4.7 billion – and many of these instruments begin to amortize next October. What a coincidence.
Pair this up with the over $6 billion in ‘prepaid oil shipment’ debts owed to Russian oil giant Rosneft, and the remaining balance on the over $63 billion owed to China in the FCCV oil-for-cash deal, and the numbers fail to add up very quickly…
(NOTE: It’s not that we haven’t done our homework and weren’t aware of those off-balance-sheet liabilities on time; it’s just that they are so completely walled-off from the public sphere that it’s actually impossible to keep up with them, and much less so to get a sense of the precise terms of each one of these obligations. Therefore, this list is by no means exhaustive.)
By the way, one would think that the most recent round of US sanctions explicitly forbid any kind of near-term credit easing, such as term extensions on current loans, right? And yet, the Venny Bulls have developed a near-mystical faith in the government’s capacity to make the payments somehow. The chatter keeps coming.
Dude, I’m not worried at all about the coupon being late or about all these off-balance-sheet loans. Remember PDVSA 35s last November? China Fund grace period extension? This is all just business as usual! ¡Sopórtala! Besides, short-end bonds are on fire. They will manage to muddle through, I’m sure.
This isn’t a normal amount of optimism, nor of cynicism. It’s a special blend. Venny Bull Blend.
After the climax of panic selling on July 31st, two separate stories in Venny debt: ‘Short-end’ bonds are rallying to all-time highs, while ‘Long-end’ bonds drift to all-time lows. Venezuela will pay at all costs, or at least that’s what the market is still betting on.
Source: Bloomberg Professional Service

Sanctions fallout, Pt. II

“Dudes, no coupon yet, right?”
“Man, it’s 11pm on a tuesday, do you really think the funcionarios at the Public Credit office are gonna work now? Chill out bro, tomorrow is another day…”
“Oh, no, I’m chill, it’s my boss that wants to throw himself out of the window, LOL.”
It’s now September 20th and close to a week has passed since the V27 coupon is due with no signs of it getting paid. The ONCP is nowhere to be seen. Bulls are getting more scared as time passes.
Aprieta y gana, chamo”. “Hang on and win, pal”.
Traders were pretty scared at this point to notice the devastating implications of a piece that flew under the radar earlier in the week. Turns out that PetroChina Americas, the US entity of a major state-owned Chinese oil company and a key intermediary in the China-Venezuela Oil Fund throughout the years, reviewed the current oil-for-cash deals and recommended that no new loans were extended to PDVSA after the imposition of US financial sanctions to the sector. Rollovers on existing debt would also be off-bounds. While this doesn’t mean that Venezuela has no way to receive credit relief from China, it suggests that any financing operation involving the US financial sector, including dollar-denominated deals, is off-bounds.
Now the desperation of the Maduro administration to ‘free themselves from the tyranny of the Dollar’ makes complete sense. Not even their Chinese allies dare go against the sanctions. And speaking about sanctions… The game isn’t over. Trump is willing to keep on tightening the screws if Maduro doesn’t change course on his authoritarian conduct. New and harsher penalties may come any day now.

The tweet that finally came

September 21st, day 6 of the grace period. Traders are bracing for the worst and long-end, ‘low-dollar-value’ bonds once again trade below the psychological 30 cents-on-the-dollar level. 
Check what ONCP just tweeted! (payment confirmation of irrelevant VEF-denominated public debts). What a bunch of fucking trolls.”
The trading day went by with the same uncertainty. Bloomberg posted a first-word quick piece, telling that calls to the ONCP about the payment were unanswered. Doom reigned supreme.
“Dude, did they make the transfer?”
“No man, why?”
“Bonds are getting lifted as we speak. What’s going on??”
5 minutes after bond prices rebounded, finally, the much-awaited, real tweet came by – “Venezuela fulfills its obligations”.  The ONCP once again cited ‘operational setbacks’ to justify the delays. At the time of writing, not all investors have received the payment, but payment agent BNY Mellon confirmed that the coupons were ‘being processed’.
We don’t know if last month’s court indictment that gave Crystallex the right to seize monies held by Venezuela in BNY Mellon have anything to do with these setbacks, or if they in any way might complicate things down the road.
“Who’s up for a night out? Drinks on me!! Venezuela cumple, carajo!”

Zur Komplexität von internationalen Wertschriftentransaktionen.....auch unter dem Aspet DTC und Zahlungen auf Venezuelaanleihen


Donnerstag, 19. Oktober 2017

zur Nomenklatur der Zahlungsmitteilungen auf: https://twitter.com/ONCP_VE



Obwohl der halbjahres Coupon noch nicht gezahlt wurde werden hier nur Stückzinsen für 13 Tage gezahlt


stimmt das ?


§ 398 Abtretung

Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)
§ 398 Abtretung

Eine Forderung kann von dem Gläubiger durch Vertrag mit einem anderen auf diesen übertragen werden (Abtretung). Mit dem Abschluss des Vertrags tritt der neue Gläubiger an die Stelle des bisherigen Gläubigers.

BGB §§ 398, 793 Die Übertragung der in einer Inhaberschuldverschreibung verbrieften Forderung durch Abtretung nach § 398 BGB bedarf zu ihrer Wirksamkeit nicht der Übergabe der Wertpapierurkunde. BGH, Urteil vom 14. Mai 2013 - XI ZR 160/12



20 % fiktive Quellensteuer (nur für D wichtig) Ecuador emitió bonos a 10 años por USD 2.500 millones 19 octubre, 2017

20 % fiktive Quellensteuer (nur für D wichtig)

Ecuador emitió bonos a 10 años por USD 2.500 millones
19 octubre, 2017

El país colocó un bono por 2.500 millones con un vencimiento a 10 años y un rendimiento de 8,875%. De esta manera, Ecuador realizó la mayor emisión de deuda en décadas y la número tres este año, según Reuters.

Además, la operación se consideró barata desde el lado de los inversionistas en comparación con otros países emisores de deuda de Latinoamérica con calificación B. Los instrumentos de deuda argentinos con vencimiento en 2027 se transan con un rendimiento de 5,4% y los de El Salvador de 2027 con un rendimiento de 6,25%.