Gesamtzahl der Seitenaufrufe

Freitag, 5. September 2014

Replacement of Trustee by Holders of Argentina Exchange Bonds to Protect Their Rights A 50.1% majority of the holders of the bonds issued in Argentina’s 2005 and 2010 exchanges (Exchange Bonds) has the power to appoint a new Trustee and new paying agents that have no operations in the United States

Replacement of Trustee by Holders of Argentina Exchange Bonds to Protect Their Rights
A 50.1% majority of the holders of the bonds issued in Argentina’s 2005 and 2010 exchanges 
(Exchange Bonds) has the power to appoint a new Trustee and new paying agents that have no 
operations in the United States. This will protect payments to Exchange Bondholders from blocking,
attachment or diversion to the government’s hold-out creditors. There will be no exchange of bonds
and no change in the governing law or jurisdiction of the Exchange Bonds. There is no risk of capital
controls. Argentina will be able to honor its obligation to pay the Exchange Bondholders without
making any payments to hold-out creditors.
The entire Trustee replacement process is initiated and controlled by the Exchange Bondholders who
are protecting their legal rights under their bonds. The Republic plays no active role and simply meets
its legal obligations under the Exchange Bonds. The collective action clauses in the Exchange Bonds
will be used to effect the technical steps required to complete the Trustee replacement process. Once
the Trustee is replaced, payments on the Exchange Bonds will be received by the holders and the
default will be cured. Once Argentina and the hold-out creditors reach a settlement, the Exchange
Bondholders can unilaterally reappoint a major international bank as Trustee.
The small legal risk that US Courts will reverse their decisions that the Exchange Bondholders are not
bound by the injunctions issued in the hold-out case and are not restricted from exercising their legal
rights can be eliminated. The Exchange Bondholders may withdraw their vote to replace the Trustee if
a US court issues an order prohibiting Exchange Bondholders from exercising their legal right to
replace the Trustee.
I. Power of Bondholders to Appoint Trustee
Under the Trust Indenture of the Argentina bonds issued in the 2005 and 2010 exchanges (Exchange
Bonds), the holders of a 50.1% majority of each series of Exchange Bonds may at any time remove the
Trustee and appoint a successor Trustee (Section 5.9(c)) 1
. The new Trustee will have the power to
appoint new paying agents (Section 3.5(a)).
The Republic does not have a right of approval or veto over the appointment of a new Trustee by the
bondholders. The old Trustee cannot prevent its removal or the appointment of the new Trustee.
In addition, a 50.1% majority of the holders of each series of Exchange Bonds has the right to direct
the time, method and place of exercising any power of the Trustee (Section 4.11(a)).
II. Replacement of Trustee by Exchange Bondholders to Protect Their Rights
A 50.1% majority of the holders of each series of Exchange Bonds will appoint a new Trustee. The
new Trustee will appoint new paying agents. The new Trustee and the new paying agents will not
have any operations in the United States. This places funds held by these institutions and the
institutions themselves beyond the reach of US courts. A new Trustee and paying agent in Buenos
Aires is the most direct mechanism to implement the structure. Once the Republic reaches a
 1 All references are to the corresponding section of the Trust Indenture of the Exchange Bonds.

.......

http://ftalphaville.ft.com/files/2014/09/ARG-Replacement-of-Trustee-III.pdf

Keine Kommentare:

Kommentar veröffentlichen