|
|
IMF reaches limit for loans to Greece, says Greek representative
Greece’s representative Thanos Catsambas sees good will for Athens but says any additional funding will be up to the EU
By Tom Ellis
Greece’s foreign creditors will
rubber-stamp the country’s bailout deal based on the sustainability of
its debt, as well as the securing of further funding, which will
effectively come in the form of an extension to the fiscal adjustment
program or a new haircut, Thanos Catsambas, the country’s representative
to the International Monetary Fund, told Kathimerini.
The Greek representative to the IMF -- which together with the European
Commission and the European Central Bank comprises the so-called troika
-- stresses, however, that any additional funding for the country would
come exclusively from its European partners, as the IMF has exhausted
its lending capacity for Athens.
Catsambas, who is one of the IMF’s alternative executive directors,
argues that Greece is currently enjoying a higher level of “good will”
from its partners, stressing the importance of recent comments by the
IMF’s Deputy Managing Director David Lipton, in which he said that Prime
Minister Antonis Samaras and Finance Minister Yannis Stournaras “are
dedicated to finding an appropriate path for adjustment.”
What are the goals and the timeline set by the troika’s inspectors in Athens over the next few weeks?
The troika will try to assess the progress of the [fiscal adjustment]
program according to the implementation of measures as well as in
macroeconomic terms. Based on this data, it will negotiate with the
government a modified memorandum aimed at economic growth in as short a
time as possible, under two indisputable conditions: sustainability of
the external debt and finding additional funds. The latter is also
connected to a possible extension of the program and the targets of the
adjustment.
What role does the head of the IMF’s mission to Greece, Poul Thomsen,
play and what are his expectations of the Greek government?
As chief of the IMF mission, Thomsen is responsible for coordinating the
technical team that is carrying out the program and for negotiations
with the Greek government in regard to modifications to the memorandum.
The objective is to draw up a “progress report” on commitments made by
the Greek government to measures that should have been adopted by the
end of May and by the end of August. This package includes the
well-known commitments for reductions in spending amounting to 11.6
billion euros, which form the core of the fiscal measures for the
2013-14 period. The negotiations are focused on the level at which these
commitments have been met and on reviewing the targets and commitments
of the Greek government, if this is deemed necessary.
When is the IMF’s Executive Committee scheduled to meet on Greece and
when will the disbursement of the next tranche of funding be discussed?
Based on the Fund’s internal deadlines, the annual summit with the World
Bank on October 9-14 in Tokyo and certain other necessary actions, my
estimate would be that the discussion cannot take place before the last
week of October. The IMF’s internal procedures are pretty complicated.
The first draft for the final report that will be presented for approval
to the Executive Committee will be drawn up by the IMF’s European
Department, which has the overall supervision of the Greek program. The
final draft then includes the participation of experts from at least
another three departments who carry out detailed checks of the legal,
fiscal and comparative aspects of the program with other countries.
Haircut or extension?
Does the IMF foresee additional financing in the form of Official
Sector Involvement [or OSI, a term which refers to a restructuring of
the debts held by Greece’s international creditors] or an extension to
the fiscal adjustment program as more likely?
Both forms are complementary, though not mutually exclusive. An
extension to the program will mean more funding as the adjustment will
become milder and, as a result, the public sector’s borrowing
requirements will be greater. Covering the borrowing requirements could
take two forms: either additional funding (with more favorable terms) or
by a restructuring of the debt held by the official sector.
However, any additional funding in any form will come exclusively from
Europe. The IMF has exhausted its possibilities to extend the loan
beyond the amount approved last March. Therefore, and even if the IMF
considers OSI to be the most advisable solution, the final decision
rests with Greece’s European partners and will be determined by the
political and institutional restrictions faced by governments and the
ECB.
What is the general feeling about Greece at the IMF, and how were
Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras’s meetings with French President
Francois Hollande, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Eurogroup
Chairman Jean-Claude Juncker viewed?
Let me start with Juncker. In a recent telephone exchange between the
prime minister and [IMF Managing Director Christine] Lagarde, she asked
Samaras to share his impressions from his meetings with the European
officials. The overall impression of the prime minister and the personal
assessment of the managing director is that right now Greece is
enjoying the highest level of good will from its partners that it has
had since the long pre-election period.
Personally I give greater weight to the recent comments by David Lipton,
who said that the prime minister and finance minister “are dedicated to
finding an appropriate path for adjustment, getting things back on
track, and we’re trying to help.” Such words from a reserved and
rational person are the best that the government could expect under the
circumstances.
Is the general feeling that Greece will get the next installment of funding and also remain in the eurozone?
Right now Greece has a financial team of international caliber working
like a well-oiled machine and working night and day to make up for
ground lost during the extended electoral process. The prime minister
has handpicked his closest associates on their merit and he himself has a
reputation for being a hands-on manager who does not give in to
political expediency. Therefore, I have faith in the former and hope for
the latter.
Is it true that in the spring of 2010 the IMF estimated that the
program was not working and that a restructuring was necessary, as your
predecessor Panayiotis Roumeliotis has asserted?
I am not in a position to answer that question given that I was not
acting in an official capacity in the spring of 2010 and had no
participation in behind-the-scenes negotiations. I do not know what
Roumeliotis was referring to exactly, but I can say this: The program
has proceeded as planned and the only “failure” has been that the public
sector still has significant borrowing needs, despite the unprecedented
haircut on privately held Greek debt. In other words, the adjustment
has not yet been as successful as one would have expected.
Recession & unemployment
Yet within the context of the fiscal adjustment, for the past two
years Greece has been experiencing an unprecedented recession and a
rapid rise in unemployment.
Without structural reforms, the public sector’s borrowing needs can only
be contained by a greater recession. With structural reforms and an
increase in overall demand, the adjustment would have been achieved with
far smaller negative consequences to the real economy. I must remind
you, though, that a few months ago, Gikas Hardouvelis, the economic
adviser to then-Prime Minister Lucas Papademos, had said that over the
course of 2011 just 22 percent of the measures in the first memorandum
had been implemented. It defies all reason to argue that the program
failed when the government, consciously or not, implemented just
one-fifth of the agreed measures.
Was a recession of this length and magnitude expected?
Any reliable macroeconomist with experience in fiscal adjustment
programs would have expected Greece to go through a period of recession
and to experience a drop in living standards that would last for several
years. The economic term “internal devaluation” is a euphemism for the
anticipated decline in living standards.
I had drawn attention to the recession in February 2011, when I also
made three observations: first, that the Greeks’ standard of living
would drop significantly and systematically for three to five years;
second, that if the authorities did not succeed in dealing with the
persistent problem of tax evasion, the game would be lost; and third,
Greece’s new growth model should be based on the service sector, with a
small participation from the primary sector. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Keine Kommentare:
Kommentar veröffentlichen