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The Gathering Storm


Lee C. Buchheit 


Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP - New York Office

G. Mitu Gulati 


Duke University - School of Law

July 11, 2013

Abstract:     
The contingent liabilities of a sovereign, such as guarantees of the debts of third parties, can normally be kept off the balance sheet of the sovereign guarantor. That is their charm. As the debt to GDP ratios of many developed countries approach red-zone levels, contingent liabilities are increasingly being favored over direct, on-the-balance-sheet, borrowings.

But what happens if a country carrying large contingent liabilities needs to restructure its debt? The borrower dare not leave its contingent claims out of the restructuring. To do so would risk undermining the financial predicates of the sovereign’s economic recovery program should the beneficiaries of the guarantees demand payment in full after the restructuring closes.

Attempting to shoehorn sovereign contingent liabilities into a debt restructuring, however, is a particularly challenging task. There are few precedents for how to do so, and no good precedents. The explosion in the size of contingent sovereign obligations since the financial crisis began in 2008 inevitably means that these issues will need to be confronted sooner or later, probably sooner.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19
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Suggested Citation

Buchheit, Lee C. and Gulati, G. Mitu, The Gathering Storm (July 11, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292669

Contact Information

Lee C. Buchheit (Contact Author)
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP - New York Office ( email )
One Liberty Plaza
New York, NY 10006-1470
United States
Gaurang Mitu Gulati
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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